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Abstract
The issue of oil spill emergency response in north-west Russia has become
increasingly important following a substantial increase in maritime transport
and major offshore developments in Russian waters. This study is an initial
effort to outline the public and private agencies and organizations involved in
handling oil spills in the Murmansk region and the structure of the oil spill
emergency response system in the region. This study examines the formal
relationships between federal and regional authorities and between the
different subsystems at the regional level. Due to the paucity of academic
literature and public documentation on this topic, this study to a large extent
bases itself on interview data. A main finding is that the regional oil spill
response system has not been fully developed. It further concludes that the
system lacks a clearly formulated state policy, a single governing authority and
a unified structure. Finally, the study demonstrates that the agencies and
organizations involved in tackling oil spill emergencies in the Murmansk
region are hampered by insufficient funding, which probably reduces their
preparedness to combat oil spills.
Interest in oil and gas developments in the Russian Arctic
has increased significantly in recent years, with the
Murmansk region receiving special attention due to the
petroleum industry’s large-scale development plans, such
as the Stockman gas field, and a substantial increase in oil
transportation. In the early 2000s, tankers began to
deliver oil from the Russian Arctic through the Barents
Sea and along the Norwegian coast to Europe. The
annual volumes of transported oil have increased
steadily since then and are expected to increase further
(Bambulyak & Frantzen 2005, 2007, 2009; AMAP 2007).
The petroleum industry’s projected developments
may have considerable socio-economic benefits for the
Russian Arctic. However, they also pose an increased risk
of oil spills, with potentially detrimental effects on the
natural environment (Andreyeva & Kryukov 2008). The
Arctic is particularly sensitive to oil spills because of its
vulnerable ecosystem, slow recovery patterns and diffi-
culties associated with clean-up operations in remote
cold regions (AMAP 2007; Patin 2008). The threat to
the marine environment from petroleum activity in the
Barents Sea is considered to be higher than in other far
northern regions (Kalinka et al. 2008; Shavykin et al.
2008; Forsgren et al. 2009). The shipping routes are close
to shore and oil spills may reach the shorelines of the
Murmansk region in less than 24 hours. If a spill occurs in
the Kola or Kandalaksha bays, oil will reach its shore
within just a few hours (Baharev & Glazov 2007).
One recent example of an oil spill incident in Russia is
the tragedy that occurred in the Kerch Strait, a narrow
passage connecting the Black and Azov seas, on 11
November 2007, when a severe storm hit the strait.
Eleven vessels were damaged; five sank and eight sailors
were killed. The tanker Volgoneft-139, loaded with heavy
fuel oil, ran aground and broke apart, spilling oil into the
waters of the strait (Spiridonov 2008). The oil spread
quickly, heavily contaminating the water and coastline
and causing the deaths of thousands of birds and fish
(Bambulyak & Frantzen 2009). The incident exposed the
absence of a functioning oil spill emergency response
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(OSER) system in the region and highlighted the lack of
coordination between the agencies taking part in the
emergency response operation (Cay 2008).
The Kerch Strait incident illustrates what can happen if
an OSER system is not in place or fails to perform.
Environmentalists have called the Kerch Strait disaster
‘‘the prologue to the impending tragedy of the Northern
Seas’’ (Greenpeace 2007). So far no major accidents have
occurred in the Murmansk region. However, cases of oil
pollution in the region are regular (AMAP 2007;
Andreyeva & Kryukov 2008; Bambulyak & Frantzen
2009; INF 7 [see Table 1 for details about informants]),
particularly in the Kola Bay (Committee 2009), where oil
concentrations in the waters greatly exceed legal levels
(Denisov 2002 cited by Andreyeva & Kryukov 2008).
The risk of oil spills cannot be eliminated entirely
(Ornitz & Champ 2002), but it is possible to establish
preventive measures to reduce their likelihood and also
to reduce the impacts of spills that do occur. This study is
an initial research effort to analyse the OSER system in
the Murmansk region of the Russian Arctic. The main
question addressed in this paper is how the OSER system
in the Murmansk region is organized in terms of its
formal structure and the roles and functions of the key
actors ascribed by their mandates. It must be noted that
the system discussed here has never been involved in a
large oil spill emergency operation, so there are no
incidents on which to base an evaluation of its actual
performance in a large-scale emergency. As noted by
informants, particularly representatives of emergency
response organizations, small-scale oil spills are regular
events and response organizations conduct operations to
deal with them. However, the question of how the
system performs in a major emergency situation remains
theoretical.
This study is inspired by systems theory in which the
system itself is regarded as a unit of the analysis, although
a system is first and foremost ‘‘a set of elements standing
in interaction’’ (Von Bertalanffy 1956: 39). The primary
objective of this paper is to analyse the roles and
functions of the main actors and how they are connected
in the OSER system. This study approaches the OSER
system from two dimensions: the vertical, which analyses
the delineation of authority and functions between the
federal centre and the region; and the horizontal, which
focuses on the relationships between different sectors,
sectoral agencies and other actors in the OSER system at
the federal and the regional level. For a discussion of
vertical and horizontal analyses of organizations, see
Christensen et al. (2007). Lie (2010) applies this ap-
proach to a study of the inter-organizational coordination
of food safety policies in Norway.
OSER is defined as ‘‘[a]ny action undertaken to
prevent, reduce, monitor or combat oil pollution’’ (IMO
1995: 15). This definition emphasizes the complexity of
oil spill response and the wide range of issues and tasks it
has to address (Ornitz & Champ 2002; Tuler et al. 2007;
Taylor et al. 2008; IOSC 2008; Bambulyak & Frantzen
2009). Task complexity provides for a complex organiza-
tional system in which activities of numerous organiza-
tions are integrated. Good organization is one of the key
elements that are crucial for successful oil spill response
(Ott et al. 1999).
Method of data collection
With few public documents on the subject, this study
relied greatly on interview data. Semi-structured inter-
views were conducted with 13 informants between
August 2007 and April 2009 in Murmansk (Table 1).
The formal role of the organizations that the informants
represented was a general criterion for selecting them.
Prior to interviews, the informants were provided with a
short description of the research project and those who
required the interview questions in advance received
them. Informants were assured that they would be
anonymized in publications reporting the research find-
ings. The author asked for permission to record inter-
views with a dictaphone, which two out of 13 informants
refused. Eleven interviews were recoded and later tran-
scribed, while in two cases notes were taken by hand. The
author was the sole interviewer, and the informants were
interviewed singly, in Russian. After the initial interviews
were carried out, the author contacted several informants
to clarify issues that arose during the analysis of the
interviews and other sources of information.
In addition to the interview data, the study draws on
such texts as law documents publicly available on the
website of the Russian government. Other sources were
gathered through literature searches and were provided
by the informants.
The OSER system: the federal level
There is no Russian legislation that clearly states that an
OSER system has to be established or that specifies the
authority responsible for its implementation. There are
several governmental resolutions and orders that assign
certain functions of oil spill protection to particular
organizations, yet none provides a clear picture of the
system as a whole.
All questions related to emergency situations in Russia,
including OSER activity, are the remit of federal autho-
rities. OSER in Russia is a tiered system conducted at
Oil spill preparedness in the Murmansk region M. Ivanova
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multiple levels by the federal executive authorities, the
administrations of the Russian Federation’s subunits
(including local administrations) and oil companies
(Government of Russia 2002; Semanov & Ivanchin
2004). Russian legislation classifies an oil spill as a ‘state
of emergency’ (Government of Russia 2000) and to
understand the OSER system one has to relate it to the
general system of emergency prevention and response
in Russia.
All issues related to emergency prevention and
response and security are addressed by the Unified State
System of Emergency Prevention and Response as
defined in a government resolution passed in 2003
(Government of Russia 2003). The OSER system is part
of this Unified State System and all legislation on oil
spill emergency prevention and response stems from it.
Key actors
Three ministries are key actors at the federal level. The
Ministry of Emergencies is responsible for civil defence,
the protection of the population and territories from
emergencies and fire, and the safety of water facilities
(President 2004). It is also responsible for the Unified
State System (Government of Russia 2003; President
2004). The Ministry of Emergencies is the main co-
ordinating authority for all emergency rescue units and
services (Government of Russia 2003). This makes the
Ministry of Emergencies the de facto coordinating
authority for the OSER on land (Government of Russia
2003).
The Ministry of Transport is responsible for the
establishment of the OSER at sea (Government of
Russia 2003). This is a huge authority composed of
several federal agencies. Subordinate to the Ministry of
Transport are the Federal Agency of Marine and River
Transport and the State Marine Emergency Rescue and
Salvage Coordination Service (Gosmorspasslužba [the
ISO 9:1995 CyrillicRoman transliteration system is
used throughout this article]; Ministry 2009b). The
Federal Agency of Marine and River Transport carries
out the general management of the OSER system at sea,
while the State Marine Emergency Rescue and Salvage
Coordination Service controls the daily operational
activity of the system (Ministry 2009b).
The third main actor is the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Ecology, which is responsible for pol-
icy-making, control and supervision related to the
study, use, reproduction and protection of natural
resources and the environment. Control and super-
vision are performed by two federal services: the
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Service (Rosprirodnadzor) and the Federal Service for
Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Surveillance (Ros-
tehnadzor). Both services were subordinate to the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology until 23
June 2010, when the Federal Service for Ecological,
Technological and Nuclear Surveillance was placed di-
rectly under the government. Together with the Ministry
of Emergencies, the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Ecology classifies oil spills and thereby decides how much
the polluting party will be fined (Ministry 2003a).
Legislation and contingency planning
There are currently more than 50 legal documents,
including federal laws, governmental resolutions, pre-
sidential decrees, ministerial orders and regional law
documents, regulating different aspects of oil spill re-
sponse in Russia (Sokolova 2008). Nevertheless, it is
difficult to identify a unified state policy regarding oil spill
protection that clearly defines the system and delineates
the main actors and their functions.
All activities related to oil spill response are carried out
according to oil spill contingency plans (Government of
Russia 2002; Commission 2008). All enterprises whose
activities involve operations with oil are obliged to have
contingency plans (Government of Russia 2002). Con-
tingency plans are developed according to the require-
ments and take into account the maximum possible
volumes of oil spilled (Government of Russia 2000).
Since oil spills are classified depending on the volume of
oil spilled, contingency plans are worked out for combat-
ing spills of different levels, as is explained below, and are
enacted depending on the category of oil spill. Inter alia,
the oil spill contingency plans provide an algorithm of
actions to be taken during an emergency response
operation and thus are meant to facilitate preparedness.
The Ministry of Emergencies has set the general requi-
rements and endorsement procedure for the plans
(Ministry 2004).
Oil spills are classified by the Russian legislation in
terms of their potential severity. There are five categories
of oil spills on land: local*up to 100 tonnes; municipal*
from 100 to 500 tonnes within the borders of the
municipality or up to 100 tonnes outside the facility
border; territorial*from 500 to 1000 tonnes within the
administrative borders of the subunit or 100500 tonnes
outside the border of a municipality; regional*from
1000 to 5000 tonnes or 5001000 tonnes outside the
administrative borders of the subunit; federal*more
than 5000 tonnes or the spill crossing state borders
irrespective of the size of the spill (Government of Russia
2000). The classification of spills at sea is less
complex and includes only three categories: local*up
to 500 tonnes; regional*from 500 to 5000 tonnes; and
federal*exceeding 5000 tonnes (Government 2000).
By law, oil spills at sea are supposed to be contained
within four hours and spills on land within six hours
(Government of Russia 2000, 2002). These time limits are
unconditional. However, in the majority of incidents they
are impossible to abide by even in theory (Semanov
2005; Glazov 2008 cited by Cay 2008).
The International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association distinguishes three levels of oil
spill emergency preparedness (IPIECA 2007). In Russia,
the first level responds to local and municipal spills, the
second to territorial and regional spills and the third to
federal spills. Oil operators are primarily responsible for
oil spill containment. However, very few such operators
have their own response teams and the majority prefer to
buy these services from professional response providers.
In practice, with few exceptions, professional response
organizations conduct operations at all levels.
In sum, the organization of oil spill emergency pre-
paredness and response in Russia is a federal responsibility.
An extensive legislation base formalizes and regulates the
activity of state authorities and oil companies, and oil spill
contingency plans are used to govern the activities during
oil spill response operations. However, the regulations are
not coherent. Moreover, the very foundation of the system
is lacking since there is no law stipulating the need for an
OSER system. There is no unified state policy, no unified
approach on how to provide oil spill response, and no
single document that would define the OSER system.
There are federal authorities that carry out certain
responsibilities pertaining to OSER but it is not obvious
how their mandates are coordinated.
The OSER system: the regional level
The general structure of the OSER system at the regional
level largely reflects the structure at the federal level.
Although federal authorities are formally responsible
for the establishment of the OSER system, regional
authorities are in charge of actual oil spill operations
(Government of Russia 2003). The region’s deputy
governor*as head of the Emergency Commission estab-
lished in the event of an incident*leads the operation.
The functions of the Emergency Commission are con-
sidered in greater detail in later sections.
Subordinate departments of the federal Ministry of
Transport and Ministry of Emergencies operate at the
regional level and are responsible for the OSER system in
the Murmansk region. The structure of the operational
part of the OSER system is presented in Table 2. The table
Oil spill preparedness in the Murmansk region M. Ivanova
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illustrates the vertical and horizontal differentiation in
the OSER system between levels of authority and
between OSER at sea and on land. Two response
organizations are listed in the table: the majority of the
informants regarded them as the main response providers
in the Murmansk region. The actual number of search-
and-rescue organizations in the region is 10 (Commission
2008). They include not only specialized oil spill response
units but also organizations engaged in other types of
rescue activity.
OSER at sea
The Ministry of Transport provides OSER at sea through
two subordinate agencies that operate in the region: the
Murmansk Marine Salvage Coordination Centre and the
Murmansk Basin Emergency Rescue and Salvage Depart-
ment (hereafter MBERSD; Ministry 2009b). The Mur-
mansk Marine Salvage Coordination Centre is the main
communication point during offshore oil spill incidents.
It receives information about spills and communicates it
further to the State Marine Salvage Coordination Centre
in Moscow, a body that is part of the State Marine
Emergency Rescue and Salvage Coordination Service,
and notifies the appropriate authorities in the region.
The MBERSD operates in accordance with the Regio-
nal Oil Spill Contingency Plan for the Western Arctic
Sector (Ministry 2003b). The plan is worked out by the
Central Marine Research and Design Institute. This plan
covers, inter alia, the amount of oil transported, types of
transportation vessels, assessment and statistical risks of
possible oil spills, hazardous areas, oil spill preventive
measures and organization of emergency response,
notification and communication, emergency response
logistics, safety measures, specialists training, cost assess-
ment and compensation for environmental damage
(Ministry 2003b). The MBERSD is responsible for hand-
ling oil spills from 500 up to 5000 tonnes in the Western
Arctic Sector, including the Barents and Kara seas
and the shorelines of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk
region, as well as the Nenec, Yamalo-Nenec and Tajmyr
(Dolgano-Nenec) autonomous regions (Ministry 2003b).
The MBERSD has also received a licence for conducting
oil spill response operation on land (INF 13).
The MBERSD has nine rescue vessels at its disposal in
Murmansk (INF 13). One vessel is leased out on a
commercial basis and operates in the Black Sea. At any
one time, about two vessels are usually undergoing
routine maintenance or are being repaired (INF 13).
Interviewees in the MBERSD considered the number of
vessels to be sufficient (INF 2; INF 13). However, it was
noted that it is not possible to meet the legal four-hour
limit for oil spill containment due to the size of the
territory (INF 2; Glazov 2008 cited by Cay 2008).
As a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, the MBERSD is
permitted to engage in commercial activities (Russian
Federation 2002) to supplement the financing it receives
from the state, which covers merely 2530% of the
MBERSD’s budget (INF 2; INF 13). The MBERSD’s
commercial activities include towages, diving services,
underwater technical projects, offshore installation build-
ing and repair, other services for oil companies and
accident prevention and response activities during re-
loading and transshipment operations (INF 13). The
MBERSD is also responsible for implementing the Joint
RussianNorwegian Contingency Plan for the Combat-
ment of Oil Pollution in the Barents Sea (Bambulyak &
Frantzen 2005). The department had taken part in
annual joint oil spill combating exercises since 1994.
OSER on land
The federal authority responsible for the OSER system on
land is not explicitly specified by any legal or policy
Table 2 Agencies and organizations responsible for different aspects of the oil spill emergency response system (OSER) in the Murmansk region.
Levels of the OSER
system/plans Sea Land territory
Authorities Federal
Ministry of Transport Ministry of Emergencies
Regional
Subordinate authorities of the Ministry of Transport Subordinate authorities of the Ministry of Emergencies
Response organizations (1) Murmansk Basin Emergency Rescue and Salvage
Department (state)
(2) Emergency Rescue Unit Navecoservice Ltd. (private)
(1) Emergency Rescue Unit Navecoservice Ltd. (private)
(2) Murmansk Basin Emergency Rescue and Salvage Department
(state)
Oil industry Own or contracted response units Own or contracted response units
Contingency plans Regional oil spill contingency plan for the Western
Arctic Sector
Murmansk regional oil spill contingency plan
M. Ivanova Oil spill preparedness in the Murmansk region
Citation: Polar Research 2011, 30, 7285, DOI: 10.3402/polar.v30i0.7285 5
(page number not for citation purpose)
document. However, the responsibility of the Ministry of
Emergencies for coordinating all emergency rescue units
and services on Russian territory (Government of Russia
2003) makes it the de facto coordinating authority for the
OSER system on land. The Main Department of the
Ministry of Emergencies of Russia in the Murmansk
region represents the Ministry of Emergencies in the
region and is a central actor in the regional OSER system.
OSER operations on land are conducted in accordance
with the Murmansk Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan
(Commission 2008). This plan is developed by the
regional Emergency Commission and finalized by the
Main Department of the Ministry of Emergencies in
the Murmansk region. It defines the order of actions to be
taken in case of an oil spill and is valid for five years
(Ministry 2004). As the Emergency Commission is a joint
body, the regional contingency plan is the product of
several authorities (Government of Russia 2003), includ-
ing the Department for Surveillance at Sea*Murmansk
Region of the Federal Supervisory Natural Resources
Management Service in the North-West federal district,
the MBERSD, the Administration of the Murmansk
Marine Port and the Murmansk Regional Centre of
Emergency and Ecological Operations (INF 10).
Although the Main Department is largely engaged in
the OSER activity in the region (Government of Russia
2003), it has no specialized OSER unit. This task is mainly
performed by private emergency response companies.
Navecoservice Ltd., established in 2002 (INF 4), is the one
that most informants referred to: Navecoservice can
handle oil spills of up to 500 tonnes on land (INF 4).
The company is also certified to provide oil spill response
at sea and on inland water bodies for oil spills up to 100
and 500 tonnes, respectively (INF 4). In addition,
Navecoservice drafts contingency plans for oil companies.
By law, each oil company is obliged to establish its
own OSER unit or to have a contract with a licensed
response organization (Government of Russia 2002). In
the majority of cases operators prefer to outsource these
services. The inclusion of a response provider in a
contingency plan implies that it has a license and the
available resources to provide oil spill response services
for a particular company in case of an incident. The
MBERSD and Navecoservice are the main OSER provi-
ders in the Murmansk region. However, both organiza-
tions are constrained by a lack of funding despite their
commercial activities (INF 2; INF 4; INF 13). The
MBERSD currently provides services for seven oil reload-
ing terminals (INF 13) while Navecoservice has contracts
with more than 60 companies in the Murmansk region
(INF 4). Navecoservice has 17 contracts with other
organizations and companies that will provide additional
equipment and personnel in case of emergency (INF 4).
While professional response organizations are the first
to respond to contain and clean up a spill, potential third
parties can be engaged in response operations at later
stages. This includes diverse organizations that have the
equipment required for response operations on shore,
municipal search and rescue services and fire brigade
teams (Commission 2008). Finally, the military, environ-
mental organizations, the civil population and volunteers
can be mobilized during an operation. The work of all
parties is to be coordinated and governed by the
Emergency Commission.
The Emergency Commission
The Emergency Commission, established by the regional
government, plays a central role in the OSER system at the
regional level. Its full name is the Commission on
Emergency Prevention and Response and Provision
of Fire Security of the Government of the Murmansk
Region. Headed by the first deputy governor (Government
of Russia 2009), it functions as a permanent body that
convenes in the event of an oil spill or other emergency
(Government of Russia 2002).
The commission is primarily a coordinating body for
the Murmansk territorial subsystem of the Unified
State System of Emergency Prevention and Response
(Government of Russia 2003). Its primary function is to
mobilize, organize and bring together all available
resources and organizations necessary for a successful
emergency response operation in the Murmansk region.
The structure of the commission is approved by the
governor of the Murmansk region (Government of
Russia 2009). The commission has 48 permanent mem-
bers (Government of Russia 2009), including representa-
tives of the regional and city administrations, the
Ministry of Emergencies, the MBERSD, the military and
the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, the Federal Security
Service, the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological
and Nuclear Surveillance, the Federal Supervisory
Natural Resources Management Service, the regional
Department of Internal Affairs and the Russian Railways.
In addition, experts in such fields as law, hydrometeor-
ology, oceanography and marine bio-resources may be
called upon.
Monitoring and science
Monitoring and science are essential parts of any OSER
system (Ornitz & Champ 2002). This section examines
Oil spill preparedness in the Murmansk region M. Ivanova
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how monitoring and research pertaining to oil spill
management are carried out in the Murmansk region.
The Murmansk Centre for Standardization and Me-
trology and Certification and the Murmansk regional
office of the State Service for Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring are both federal authorities
that operate in the Murmansk region. The Murmansk
Centre for Standardization and Metrology and Certifica-
tion is under the Ministry of Industry and Energy while
the State Service for Hydrometeorology and Environ-
mental Monitoring is under the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Ecology. In January 2007, the Norwegian
oil company Statoil gave the administration of Mur-
mansk oil spill recovery equipment as well as a laboratory
to study oil properties and a computer programme that
models the behaviour of oil spills. Opened in June 2008
at the Murmansk Centre for Standardization and Me-
trology and Certification, the laboratory was the first of
its kind in Russia (Dedkov 2008). The aim was that oil
companies would submit oil samples for analysis and the
State Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental
Monitoring would use the data to make predictions about
the behaviour of different kinds of oil under varying
conditions (Syč 2009). However, these analyses are not
being conducted at present (Syč 2009; Pavlov 2010; INF
4; INF 13) due to a lack of funding. Because oil
companies are not legally obliged to deliver oil samples
to the laboratory for analysis, there is little income
derived from this service. Because the Murmansk Centre
for Standardization and Metrology and Certification is a
federal institution the laboratory is not funded by local
authorities (Syč 2009). At the federal level, funding is
hampered by a general reluctance to pay for environ-
mentally oriented initiatives (Hønneland & Jørgensen
2006). The laboratory thus represents an unused re-
source that could be employed to gain knowledge that
would aid in managing oil spills.
The State Service for Hydrometeorology and Environ-
mental Monitoring is responsible for monitoring envir-
onmental pollution in the region, including tracking oil
spills. Challenges related to the absence of modern means
of detection and forecasting the behaviour of oil spills are
particularly emphasized by environmentalists as a weak-
ness of the OSER system (INF 5; INF 7). The environ-
mental non-governmental organization Bellona, which is
based in Norway, claims that ‘‘[c]urrently, in Northwest
Russia and in the northern sea route there is basically no
State system . . . for tracking accidental oil spills by aero-
plane or satellite’’ (Lesikhina et al. 2007: 26). The absence
of technical means of control is a serious shortcoming
that weakens the monitoring of oil spills. In practice,
information about oil spills is only available when
reported by vessels passing by (INF 7), which implies
that if an oil spill is not observed by a passing ship it is
never registered. According to one informant, there have
been cases of unreported oil spills (INF 8). Another
informant claimed that there were six oil spills during
2007 that could have been classified as emergencies, but
emergencies were not declared (INF 7).
Regional scientific organizations are another group of
institutions that participate in oil spill management. The
Murmansk Marine Biological Institute (MMBI) and the
Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceano-
graphy (PINRO) are two major research institutions
located in Murmansk mandated to study the Arctic
ecosystem. The activities of both are partially focused
on environmental safety in relation to the development
of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, including
vulnerability to oil spills. PINRO has a specific focus on
fisheries and is in particular concerned with ecological
monitoring on the Arctic shelf (Egorov et al. 2008;
Prishchepa & Titov 2008). MMBI has a wider research
agenda. In cooperation with PINRO, MMBI has handled
environmental impact assessment in the Barents Sea
with financial support from the Barents Sea regional
office of the non-governmental environmental organiza-
tion, the World Wide Fund for Nature*Russia (Kalinka
et al. 2008; Shavykin et al. 2008). MMBI is also enga-
ged in developing new technology for biomonitoring
(Gudimov & Denisov 2008).
Thus, organizations responsible for monitoring envir-
onmental pollution and scientific research on the envir-
onmental impacts of oil spills function in the region. The
major challenge, as the later discussion shows, is in how
to incorporate these functions in the OSER system in the
Murmansk region.
OSER as a ‘‘system’’
Having presented the elements (organizations and in-
stitutions), I shall now discuss how these elements fit
together as an OSER system for the Murmansk region.
Law and policy
The OSER system in the Murmansk region is part of the
Unified State System of Emergency Prevention and
Response, based on federal legislation. However, as this
study demonstrates, the OSER system in the Murmansk
region is not fully developed (INF 1; INF 4; INF 6; INF 7;
INF 12; Baharev & Glazov 2007).
The issue of oil spill emergency preparedness came
onto the agenda in the beginning of the 1970s in Russia
(INF 11) when environmental protection had re-
M. Ivanova Oil spill preparedness in the Murmansk region
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ached the national political agenda in the Soviet Union
(Hønneland & Jørgensen 2006). The OSER system for
the sea was created then (INF 11), although the legal
order that describes the system was formalized by the
Ministry of Transport much later*in 2009 (Ministry
2009b). The OSER system on land was not established
before the early 2000s (INF 11). A working group was
organized under the Ministry of Emergencies in 2006 to
work out propositions on the establishment of the OSER
system on land (Ministry 2006). However, as of yet, no
law document has been issued that is comparable to, for
example, Order 53 of the Ministry of Transport for the
OSER system at sea. The legal structure of the OSER
system on land remains unclear.
According to Cay (2008), ‘‘the government’s will’’ to
create an adequate OSER system is insufficient. One of
the interviewees laid the blame on the lacking will of the
people, concluding that ‘‘the fundamentals of an [OSER]
system are formulated from the requirements of soci-
ety . . . If the will of the people was to create such system,
it would have been established long ago’’ (INF 4). Years
of economic and political reforms in Russia and contin-
uous reorganizations of the environmental bureaucracy
may have contributed to the slowness of the process
(Hønneland & Jørgensen 2006).
Whatever the reason, the issue of oil pollution has
clearly not attained a high position on the Russian
political agenda. Clear and meaningful strategic goals
are a precondition of success in responding to an oil spill
(USCG Marine Safety School 1994 cited by Walker et al.
1995), but the absence of a clearly formulated, enacted
and enforced state policy is emphasized by many key
actors in the Murmansk region. The opinion that ‘‘there
is no coordinator that establishes the policy’’ and there-
fore ‘‘there is no policy’’ on oil spill protection in Russia
was emphasized by several informants (INF 4; INF 7; INF
12). That is why many informants see the roots of the
problem as stemming from the federal level.
The lack of a well-defined state strategy on oil spill
protection and response reflects the overall state of
Russian environmental policy. The absence of any
decisive federal environmental policy is regarded as a
general characteristic of Russian environmental govern-
ance (Hønneland & Jørgensen 2006). It has been claimed
that ‘‘the policy of Russian federal authorities in the
environmental sector is to not have any policy at all’’
(Hønneland & Jørgensen 2006: 155). While the years
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and prior to
1991 were generally marked by the increased importance
of environmental protection on the political agenda,
later, especially in the beginning of 2000s, environmental
concerns lost their relatively influential political position
in favour of economic growth (Oldfield 2002; Hønneland
& Jørgensen 2006).
The legislation that governs the OSER system is critici-
zed, especially by environmentalists, for being inadequ-
ate for real-life circumstances and in some cases unclear
and overlapping (Lesikhina et al. 2007; INF 2; INF 4; INF
7). That oil spill protection and response are regulated by
more than 50 different legal documents may sound
reassuring. However, they have been formulated in an
uncoordinated manner by diverse governmental bodies
pursuing their own interests and as a result inconsisten-
cies flourish (Glazov 2008 cited by Sokolova 2008).
Although most legal acts regulating oil spill manage-
ment were adopted recently, many require revision and
improvement (Lihomanov 2008 cited by Sokolova 2008).
This is, for example, the case for federal law no. 151 that
regulates the activity of emergency response organiza-
tions. When this law was adopted, the majority of
response organizations were state-owned. Today, there
are around 30 private response organizations in north-
west Russia. More than 20 are operating in the St.
Petersburg and Leningrad regions. The budgets of these
companies simply do not allow them to fulfil the
obligations imposed by the federal law (Glazov 2008
cited by Sokolova 2008), including providing employees
with pensions and an apartment at the age of 45 years
and obligatory insurance while they are employed. Even
some state-run companies lack the means to fulfil these
requirements (INF 4).
The interviewees regard contingency plans as an
indispensable component of oil spill emergency prepa-
redness and response (INF 2; INF 4; INF 8). However,
some environmentalists regard the regional plans as too
‘‘theoretical’’ and ‘‘complicated’’ and remark that they
would ‘‘not contribute much in a difficult emergency
situation [or] function as an instruction that is required is
this circumstance’’ (INF 6). The claim*also made by
interviewees in the response organizations*is that in-
stead of a practical, regularly updated problem-solving
tool to serve in an emergency situation, the plans are
overly lengthy, outdated and impractical (INF 2; INF 4;
INF 6; INF 12). One informant noted that the plans need
to be updated more often since the quantity of trans-
ported oil is increasing substantially (INF 2). It has been
noted that the contingency plans at different levels
are not coordinated and there is no overall picture
of emergency management (Yanchuk 2008 cited by
Sokolova 2008). One explanation for this is a lack of
adequate cooperation between the scientific community
and the oil industry in Russia, which results in decision-
makers receiving inadequate information on which to
base their decisions (Matishov et al. 2008).
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Horizontal and vertical
This study analyses the OSER system along two structural
dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The former describes
the delineation of roles and authority in the OSER system
between the federal centre and the Murmansk region.
Centreregion relationships have been a controversial
issue in Russian politics since the establishment of the
Russian Federation in 1991, with the power balance
shifting continuously (Hønneland & Blakkisrud 2001).
Within the sphere of oil spill emergency preparedness the
authority to establish the OSER system is a federal task
and the prerogative of the federal authorities. Mean-
while, the responsibility for an emergency response
operation lies with the regional authorities.
The OSER system is divided into sea and land sectors
under the auspices of different ministries. Both sectors
sort under the regional Emergency Commission in case of
an incident at the regional level. Otherwise the sub-
systems work independently according to their man-
dates. As such there is no unitary approach or authority
in charge of the system as a whole. This leads to a
situation where the task is shared between different
authorities that ‘‘have not achieved an agreement at their
own level on who is in charge of the issue’’ (INF 7). It has
also been claimed that the OSER system has a bias
towards the sea sector (Glazov 2008 cited by Cay 2008).
For the OSER system for land it is difficult to identify
precisely how it is organized and which authority is
responsible for it (INF 4; INF 7).
The functional tasks within the OSER system are
clearly defined both between the federal and the regional
authorities and between the sectors. Sectorization at the
regional level is a reflection of sectorization at the federal
level. However, unclear mandates of the federal minis-
tries in some cases lead to frictions between the key
actors.
Operative capacity
There are uncertainties about how the response system
will function in an actual emergency. As one informant
remarked, ‘‘Nobody is able to say for sure until an
incident happens. All these issues that are described on
paper look different in reality’’ (INF 4). It has been
claimed that ‘‘in case of serious incidents when the
shoreline is damaged, the system will not be able to
respond adequately and quickly enough’’ (Glazov 2008
cited by Cay 2008). The obsoleteness of the response
equipment and old technical facilities have also been
pointed out (Lesikhina et al. 2007; Glazov 2009 cited by
Sokolova 2009; INF 4; INF 5). The problem will become
more acute as the volume of transported petroleum
increases (INF 2).
The OSER system has been established by the state as a
public good. However, part of its services are allocated to
commercial service providers; even the activity of the
MBERSD*a state agency with a public mandate*is
partly commercial. The requirements that the state sets
for these organizations, both public and private, are
sufficiently high. Conforming to them requires substan-
tial financial means and entails a time-consuming bu-
reaucratic procedure (INF 4), which is why oil companies
prefer to outsource these services. Although the market is
limited, response organizations increasingly engage in
commercial activities to bring in money. The fact that
MBERSD’s rescue vessels are leased out to other parties
on a contractual basis may potentially hamper the
capacity in the Murmansk region in a situation with
several simultaneous incidents. The engagement of
response organizations in commercial activities, and their
attempts to grab a bigger share of the market, may
impede oil spill preparedness and response in a situation
when the OSER system has numerous serious inadequa-
cies. Commercialization of the OSER system in the
Murmansk region is discussed in detail by Ivanova &
Sydnes (2010).
Science and knowledge
In September 2009 the Ministry of Emergencies an-
nounced a plan to improve the system of emergencies
monitoring and forecasting in Russia (Ministry 2009a). In
particular, the ministry declared on its website that the
‘‘[i]mprovement of this system should provide until 2020
a change of priorities in the public policy on the ensuring
of safety of the population and territory against the
dangers and threats of different nature from the ‘res-
ponse culture’ to ‘prevention culture’ ’’ (Ministry 2009a;
author’s translation). The ministry thereby indirectly
acknowledged that the current policy is focused on
response rather than the prevention of emergencies.
Although the intentions of the federal authorities may
be good, actors at the regional level express much
scepticism regarding when these intentions will actually
be implemented (INF 4; INF 13).
The shortcomings of the state system of environmental
monitoring are continuously pointed out, in particular
by the environmentalists who claim that the system
does not practically function in the Murmansk region
(Lesikhina et al. 2007; INF 5; INF 6; INF 7). Although
there are several scientific institutions in the region that
perform various kinds of environmental monitoring,
such as geophysical, geological, meteorological and
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ecological monitoring, one informant claimed that their
activities are scientific research rather than monitoring of
environmental impacts caused by anthropogenic activity
(INF 5). In addition, the activities of these organizations
are characterized as uncoordinated, unsystematic and
lacking a common agenda (INF 5). The system of oil spill
behaviour forecasting and tracking*crucial for success-
ful containment, dispersion and clean-up operations
(Ornitz & Champ 2002)*does not function in the region.
Although the establishment of a system of environ-
mental monitoring is a state prerogative, it has clearly not
been a state priority. In addition, a long-term environ-
mental policy in the field of oil and gas resources on the
Russian Arctic shelf developments has still not been
worked out (Matishov et al. 2008). An unclear state
policy has resulted in gaps and inconsistencies in the
legislation, exemplified by the absence of legal require-
ments to have oils samples analysed.
Conclusion
The current scale of petroleum activities, and their
projected increase, in the Russian Arctic and the Mur-
mansk region in particular has generated increased
concerns about how well the region is prepared to tackle
increased risks of oil pollution. Therefore, the major
question asked in this paper is how the OSER system in
the Murmansk region is organized in terms of its formal
structure and roles and functions of the key actors.
This study concludes that an OSER system in the
Murmansk region has not been fully developed. The
process of its organization is being conducted in accor-
dance with an extensive legislative framework developed
by the Russian government and responsible federal
authorities. The functional tasks within the system have
been delineated between the federal centre and the
region and between the sectors. The power to establish
the system is held by the federal authorities, while the
regional authorities’ responsibility is to organize, conduct
and coordinate emergency response operations. The
system is divided into sea and land sectors that function
under the auspices of two different ministries. Both
subsystems work independently according to their man-
dates on a daily basis. Their formal interaction patterns
are established through the contingency plans and the
regional Emergency Commission. Yet, the OSER system
has substantial shortcomings and there are numerous
inadequacies that need to be addressed.
The major weakness on the OSER system is the
absence of a statutory need to organize the system and
as a consequence the lack of a clearly formulated, unified
state policy. The functions and areas of responsibility of
the main federal authorities have to be more accurately
defined. Contingency planning requires a more practi-
cally oriented approach. In addition, the two regional
contingency plans need to be coordinated. Lack of
funding affects the ability of response organizations to
purchase new equipment and has become a constraining
factor for their activity that may hobble the effectiveness
of response operations. The commercialization of oil spill
response services may further hamper the response in
case of an emergency. With no system for monitoring or
tracking oil spills, and no research being conducted on oil
spill behaviour, the scientific component of OSER is
almost completely absent.
Regarding how the system will perform in an actual
emergency situation, some informants were optimistic
while others were not. Despite the fact that the issue has
received increased attention it is unclear how long it will
take until the OSER system is fully developed in the
Murmansk region. History shows that disasters often
precipitate major policy and regulatory changes. The Oil
Pollution Act 1990 in the US was adopted a year after the
Exxon Valdez 1989 oil spill. Within a year of the blowout
of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of
Mexico, a new US federal agency*the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement*was
created to oversee energy exploration, replacing another
agency that had been criticized for its conflicts of interests
(Walsh 2011). The Kerch Strait tragedy occurred in
November 2007. However, the federal law, On the
Protection of the Seas of the Russian Federation from
Oil Pollution, has not yet been adopted in 2011.
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will is needed.) Morskoj Biznes Severo-Zapada, 11 June.
Accessed on the internet at http://www.mbsz.ru/11/06.
php on 25 March 2010.
Christensen T., Lægreid P., Roness P.G. & Røvik K.A. 2007.
Organization theory and the public sector. Instrument, culture and
myth. London: Routledge.
Commission (Commission on Emergency Prevention and
Response and Provision of Fire Security of the Government
of the Murmansk Region) 2008. Plan po predupreždeniû i
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razliva k črezvyčaynoy situacii. (On approval of the instruction for
defining the bottom level of oil spills for classifying an acute oil spill
as an emergency.) Order no. 156 of 3 March 2003. Moscow:
Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation.
Ministry 2003b. Regional’nyj plan likvidacii razlivov nefti v
Zapadnom sektore Arktiki. (The regional contingency plan for
the western Arctic sector.) Moscow: Ministry of Transport, State
Marine Emergency and Salvage Coordination Service.
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